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Abstract—In many applications, identity management (IdM)
is used to associate a subject public key with an endpoint at
which the subject can be contacted (telephone number, email,
etc.). In decentralized applications based on distributed ledger
technologies (DLTes), it is desirable for the IdM to be decen-
tralized as well. Currently, endpoints are either verified by who
needs it, which is impractical in DLT-based applications, or by a
centralized authority, which contrasts with the spirit of DLTes.
In this paper, we show two DLT-based protocols to prove the
association between a subject and an endpoint in a decentralized
manner, contributing in filling the gap of the current IdM
approaches with respect to decentralization. Our protocols are
compatible with a wide variety of endpoints. We analyze the
security of our protocols and evaluate their performance and
cost against the common approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of identity management (IdM) is to bind
an identifier of a subject (usually a public key) with attributes,
claims, entitlements, or properties of that subject [1]. In this
paper, we focus on the process to bind a subject identifier with
an endpoint of a communication technology (or channel). In
practice, an endpoint identifies a way to contact the subject.
Examples of endpoints are web URLs, IP addresses, email
addresses, telephone numbers, postal mail addresses, etc.
Traditionally, IdM has been designed over of centralised
architectures and it consequently requires trust in third parties.
This might be a problem when an IdM is used in applications
designed for Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) that are
supposed not to rely on any centralized source of trust. As
an example, a subject could store in-chain his/her consent to
receive phone calls for marketing purposes. This can be easily
implemented storing the consent on-chain in the form of a
transaction originating from one of the subject public key(s),
but there must be some evidence that the subject’s public key
is bound to his/her phone number.
While for some applications the possession of an endpoint
may be a value per se, in certain countries, certain endpoints
are bound by law to a legal person or a natural person. For
example, this is the case for telephone numbers in Italy. In
these cases, the endpoint verification provides a big added
value.
A subject can prove the binding of one of its identi-
fiers with an endpoint by sending or receiving messages on
it. This technique is widely used in the context of multi-
factor authentication. However, currently, its adoption in a
decentralized approach requires endpoint verification to be
independently performed by each verifier that is interested
in this information. This might be a problem, if verifiers are
many, since each verification is time and resource consuming
(see Section III).
Contribution of the paper. In this paper, we present two
DLT-based protocols to perform a decentralized verification
process capable to write in-chain the proof (or certification)
of the binding between a subject identifier and an endpoint,
providing a substantial contribution to a decentralized IdM
approach. That proof, can then be used to certify the binding
without the burden of the many single verification processes.
We analyze the security of our approach against miscertifica-
tion and denial of service attacks. We also analyze the practical
applicability of the proposed protocols with several kinds of
endpoints.
Structure of the paper. In Section II, we review the state of
the art. In Section III we review basic verification processes
and introduce notation. In Section IV, we describe the two
protocols to write in-chain the proof of the binding and, in
Section V, we analyze their security. In Section VI, we present
a first evaluation of our approach and, in Section VII, we
discuss applicability aspects with several kinds of endpoints.
II. STATE OF THE ART
IdM is standardized by ISO [1] and there regulations about
it (see, for example, eIDAS [2] a regulation of the European
Union). Protocols and standards related to IdM systems are
surveyed in [3]. Identities can be useful across several or-
ganizations. For this reason, single sign-on approaches, such
as Facebook connect, are adopted [4], but usually relays on
centralized architectures. The idea of realizing IdM on top of
DLTes is a further step toward making IdM independent from
a specific organization. In private/permissioned DLTes some
kind of trust among participants exists, hence implementing
IdM over them does not introduce new conceptual problems.
The Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) approach, surveyed here [5],
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envisions solutions in which subjects should be able to cre-
ate and control their own identity, without relying on any
centralized authority. In this context, public/permissionless
DLTes are fundamental tools. W3C has ongoing efforts to
standardize the building blocks of SSI. Decentralized Iden-
tifiers (DIDs) [6] are controlled by subjects and possibly
securely stored in DLTes. DIDs are linked with DID documents
where attributes are listed. Certain attributes are associated
to Verifiable Claims/Credentials (VC) [7] which allow the
binding between the identifier and the attributes. Our approach
can be seen as a tool to implement a verifiable claim to prove
the binding between a subject identifier and an endpoint
A realization of this framework is backed by the Decen-
tralised Identity Foundation1. The relation between DIDs and
eIDAS is analyzed in [8].
One of the first attempts to design an IdM system deployed
on the blockchain trying to accomplish self-sovereign iden-
tities is Namecoin [9]. The uPort system [10] makes use of
Ethereum smart contracts and allows subjects to record simple
statements about them. Sovrin [11] is an open source identity
network built on a permissioned DLT to manage DIDs in
which only trusted institutions take part in consensus proto-
cols. ShoCard [12] is a digital identity card for mobile devices.
It binds an existing trusted credential (e.g., a passport), with
additional identity attributes by means of Bitcoin transactions.
The last three systems are also analyzed and compared in [13].
Sora [14] and DNS-IdM [15] are two further recent proposals.
III. BACKGROUND AND NOTATION
Each subject S on a blockchain is associated with at
least one pair 〈p, s〉, where p is a public key and s is
the corresponding secret key. We denote by [m]s or [m]S
the signature of a string m performed by S using s. Each
public key of S can be used as a pseudonym for S when
S have to be mentioned in any transaction recorded in the
blockchain. Subject S can easily prove its association with p
by considering a publicly known random string r (a challenge),
never used before, whose generation is not controlled by S,
and providing [r]s. In interactive protocols with two parties,
r can be generated by the party that needs the proof. In the
blockchain context, r is a cryptographic hash of some new
piece of data. For example, r can be the cryptographic hash
of the last block or a string derived by a new transaction to be
submitted (usually a transaction to be valid should be different
from all previous ones).
In this paper, we are concerned with a verifier V that intends
to assess that a subject S possesses an endpoint E. The vast
majority of techniques to achieve this result can be traced back
to the following two interactive protocols that assumes that V
already has an alternative communication mean M with S.
Protocol 1:
1) V chooses a challenge code c and sends it to endpoint
E.
2) S receives c at endpoint E and sends back c to V by M .
1 https://identity.foundation/
Protocol 2:
1) V chooses a challenge code c and sends it to S by M .
2) S sends back c to V from endpoint E.
These protocols can be adapted to bind the fact that S
possesses E with a key pair 〈p, s〉 of S. In the adapted
protocols, S sends back to V a signed version of c ([c]s),
actually proving that the subject that knows s also possesses
E. In this variation, c is essentially a challenge. In the rest
of this paper, we refer to the adapted versions of Protocols 1
and 2 as basic protocols.
In a blockchain context, we potentially have a large number
of subjects and verifiers. We recognize that the basic protocols
have the following drawbacks.
• Each time a different verifier intends to assess if S
possesses E, a new verification should be performed. This
might be a serious problem if verifiers are many and/or
verification has a cost for S.
• Each verification requires to set up an interactive protocol.
This means that either S should always be on-line or V
should be willing to wait for S to reply to the challenge.
In the spirit of the blockchain, we look for a decentralized
solution to this certification problem that does not suffer these
two drawbacks.
IV. DLT-BASED PROOFS FOR BINDINGS ENDPOINTS TO
SUBJECTS
A subject S intends to obtain a proof that (s)he owns an
end-point E, to be shown to any interested verifier. In this
section, we show two blockchain-based protocols to achieve
this goal in a decentralized manner.
We assume that the communication technology of E can
support the exchange of a message at least as large as a (pos-
sibly signed) challenge, i.e., a large enough random number.
In Protocol 3, the proof-of-possession of E is a proof that
S can send from E a signed challenge to a number of other
subjects. In Protocol 4, vice-versa, the proof-of-possession is
a proof that S can receive at E a challenge from a number of
other subjects.
Formally, S intends to obtain a credible proof of a pair
〈p,E〉 meaning that S, with public key p, owns E. We can
also write 〈S,E〉 with the same meaning. When S obtains the
proof for 〈S,E〉, we say that S is certified. For simplicity,
in the following, we assume that all subjects that are already
certified are always on-line, in the sense that they can
1) interact with E by receiving messages at E or sending
messages from E,
2) access the blocks of the blockchain including the last one,
3) monitor the transactions accepted in the blockchain and
react to them.
We relax some of these assumptions in Section IV-C. We now
introduce our two protocols.
A. Certifying that a Subject Can Send a Message from an
Endpoint
In our frist protocol, subject S with public key p obtains the
proof-of-possession of endpoint E by sending signed messages
Subject S Blockchain All certified subjectsor all committee members
1. Certification Request R = 〈p,E〉
Block containing RBlock containing R
2. Each certified subject checks if it belongs to the committee for R.
3. All committee members and S compute the random challenge Q
Concurrently by S and each already certified subjects
4. S sends P = [Q]S from endpoint E to all committee members.
5. c checks P
6. c publishes acceptance [P ]c for R
Concurrently by each committee member c
Fig. 1. Sequence diagram for Protocol 3, where S sends signed messages
to committee members from endpoint E (see Step 4).
from E to a number of different other subjects. This idea is
developed in Protocol 3. The associated diagram is shown
in Figure 1. At the end of the protocol, the certificate of
possession is published in the blockchain.
Protocol 3:
1) Certification Request. Subject S creates certification
request R = 〈p,E〉 (where p is a public key of S) and
publishes [R]S in the blockchain. Request R reaches all
participants as its block is broadcasted.
2) Committee Selection. A committee of k certified sub-
jects, is randomly selected, on the basis of R, following
the procedure detailed below. This is autonomously per-
formed by whoever needs to know the committee compo-
sition, comprising S and all DLT participants. Depending
on the communication technology, the endpoints of the
committee members may be needed, they can be obtained
from their certificates published in the blockchain.
3) Random Challenge. From the block B where R is
accepted all committee members and S computes Q =
hash(R|B).
4) Response from E. S sends from E to all committee
members the proof P = [Q]S that S can send a message
from E.
5) Committee checks. Each committee member c that re-
ceives P checks its signature and value of Q.
6) Acceptance. If checks are successful, c publishes on the
blockchain its acceptance [P ]c related to R.
a) Certificate Verification: A verifier can check the va-
lidity of the acceptance transactions related to R and count
them to see if they are k, or above a certain threshold k¯ ≤ k
(see Section IV-C).
b) Identifiers and summarization: It is useful to assign
to each new certified subject S a sequential identifier, denoted
id(S). The assignment can be done by a consensus rule to
automatically commit a transaction, in a subsequent block, that
states and summarizes the association 〈S,E, id(S)〉 for each
R = 〈S,E〉. This should be done when enough acceptance
transactions for R are committed.
c) Committee selection procedure: We assume the net-
work comprises N certified subjects. We assume their iden-
tifiers to be from 0 to N − 1, i.e., there are no holes in
the sequence of the identifiers. For a certification request R,
we select the committee C = {c1, . . . , ck}, by selecting the
identifiers id(ci) of its members. Suppose that b is the hash of
the block in which the certification request R is committed.
We use b as a shared source of randomness.
We need a deterministic method that, for each i ∈
{1, . . . , k}, randomly selects an id(ci) ∈ {0, . . . , N−1}. This
method should depend on R and b and the selection probability
should be uniformly distributed among all already certified
subjects. It is desirable for this association not to select the
same subject twice. However, if N  k, the probability of
accidentally doubly selecting the same subject is negligible.
A very simple approach is to select committee members
according to the following rule
id(ci) = hash(i|R|b) mod N.
Note that, given any deterministic association method, as
soon as a certification request R is published, each certified
subject can autonomously understand if (s)he was selected for
the committee to certify R. Further, anyone can easily check
if ci is part of the committee for R as well as enumerate the
whole committee.
B. Certifying that a Subject Can Receive a Message at an
Endpoint
In our second protocol, a subject S obtains the proof-of-
possession of endpoint E by receiving challenges at E from
a number of different other subjects. This idea is developed
in Protocol 4. The associated diagram is shown in Figure 2.
At the end of the protocol, the certificate of possession is
published in the blockchain.
Protocol 4:
1) Certification Request. Subject S creates certification
request R = 〈p,E〉 (where p is its public key) and
publishes [R]S in the blockchain. Request R reaches all
participants as its block is broadcasted.
2) Committee Selection. As in Protocol 3, a committee
of k members is randomly selected, denoted C =
{c1, . . . , ck}.
3) Challenges Generation. Each member ci of C generates
a random partial challenge Qi.
4) Challenges to E. Each ci sends Qi to endpoint E, where
S is supposed to be able to receive it.
5) Proof Publication. Subject S combines the partial
challenges received to obtain the complete challenge
Q1| . . . |Qk. S publishes on the blockchain the proof
P = [Q1| . . . |Qk|R]S that S has received all partial
challenges and hence that S can read messages at E.
Subject S Blockchain All certified subjectsor all committee members
1. Certification Request
Block containing RBlock containing R
2. c checks if it belongs to the committee for R
Concurrently by each certified subject c
4. ci sends Qi to endpoint E
3. Generate
partial challenge Qi
Concurrently by committee subjects ci with i = 1, . . . , k
5. Publish proof [Q1| . . . |Qn|R]S
6. Disclosure of Qi
Concurrently by each committee subject ci
Fig. 2. Sequence diagram for Protocol 4 in which committee members send
challenges to endpoint E (see Step 4).
6) Challenges Disclosure. After P is published, each ci
makes Qi public by a suitable transaction, also specifying
that it is related to R.
a) Certificate Verification: A verifier can check the valid-
ity of the proof P and then be sure that the association 〈p,E〉
holds. This verification can be performed by the following
procedure, which takes as input P = [Q1| . . . |Qk|R]S .
1) Check that R = 〈p,E〉 is in the blockchain.
2) Check that P is correctly signed by public key p.
3) For each i = 1, . . . , k
• In the blockchain, look for the transaction containing
the challenge disclosure for Qi related to R performed
by ci.
• Check that the challenge disclosure for Qi appears after
P in the history.
4) If all the previous checks are successful, the proof P is
valid and the association 〈S,E〉 is certified.
b) Identifiers and summarization: As for Protocol 3, a
sequential identifier id(S) should be assigned to each newly
certified subject S. The assignment can be done by a consensus
rule in which DLT nodes should execute the above verification
process and, if successful, commit a transaction that states the
association 〈S,E, id(S)〉.
c) Committee selection procedure: For the committee
selection, the same approach of Protocol 3 can be adopted.
C. Correctness Under Non-Ideal Conditions
Correctness of Protocols 3 and 4 depends on the reliability
of the challenge-response process. In particular, the committee
members, the endpoint and the communication technology
should be reliable. To tolerate a margin of committee subjects
that are not on-line (or problems during communication), we
can slightly change the protocols.
Protocol 3 can be easily adapted to tolerate a number
of missing acceptance transactions by just fixing a suitable
threshold k¯ ≤ k of members that have to accept the proof, for
it to be valid.
Protocol 4 can also be adapted. In Step 5, S may not wait
for all partial challenges but only for k¯ ≤ k of them to tolerate
a fraction of missing ones.
A further aspect is that there is no reason for committee
members to execute the certification protocol. To solve this
problem, they should be rewarded for their work. This is
not hard to do if the underlying DLT also implements a
cryptocurrency, which is often the case.
V. SECURITY
In this section, we introduce our threat model and analyze
the security of Protocols 3 and 4 in that model.
A. Threat Model
In analyzing the security of our protocols, we consider the
following threats (or malicious objectives).
Miscertification. Certification of untrue association
of subject S with endpoint E.
Denial of service (DoS). Denial of certification for a legiti-
mate 〈S,E〉 association.
We denote by N the number of certified subjects in the
network. In our model, any adversary-controlled (certified or
non-certified) subject S may deviate from the protocol in an
arbitrary way.
We assume the adversary may ask certification for several
pairs 〈Si, Ei〉. This is legitimate and easy to achieve, provided
that the adversary actually controls the Ei’s and owns keys
for subjects Si’s. These certified subjects may deviate form
the protocol and be leveraged to perform malicious actions
realizing a Sybil attack in our context. However, we assume
that only a limited number of subjects m, with m ≤ N , can
be certified by the adversary. This can be enforced in practice
in several ways. For example, if the blockchain supports a
cryptocurrency, we may regularly charge each certified subject
a fee to keep old certificates active. Hence, we can assume that
the cost of controlling m subjects is cm where c is the cost
for each subject in a certain period of time.
We assume the underlying blockchain technology to be
secure. Hence, the adversary
1) cannot tamper with the blockchain,
2) cannot stop a non-controlled subject from asking to the
blockchain to perform a transaction, and
3) cannot stop a non-controlled subject from reading from
the blockchain the committed transactions.
This also means that the adversary cannot add certifications,
delete or tamper with past certificates, or change subject
identifiers.
We assume the communication technology of E to be
immune from certain specific attacks. For both protocols, we
assume no network-level denial of service is possible. For
Protocol 3, we assume that the adversary cannot create spoofed
messages that look as if they are sent from E. For Protocol 4,
we assume the adversary cannot eavesdrop messages sent to
E.
B. Security Analysis
To prove the security of our approach against miscertifi-
cation, we should prove that it is hard for an adversary A to
certify an association 〈S,E〉, when E is not actually controlled
by A. We show that the adversary is going to spend O(N) to
perform the attack and hence that the security of our approach
increases for larger N .
Since the adversary cannot spoof/eavesdrop messages
from/to E, if E is not controlled by A, the only way that A has
to obtain the certificate is to corrupt a committee controlling
at least k¯ committee members. The corrupted committee
members can assert that they received or sent the messages
through E, as stated by our protocols, even if communication
occurred using another channel. A committee is formed by k
randomly extracted members, out of N total certified subjects,
of whose only m are corrupted. The probability p(m) that, in
a committee, at least k¯ = αk members (with 0 < α < 1)
are controlled by A is given by p(m) =
∑k
i=k¯ (
m
i )(
N−m
k−i )
(Nk)
.
Function p(m) equals 1/2 at m = αN and it is very close to
zero for m < 3/4αN This means that when N increases, the
adversary have to corrupt at least about αN subjects to have
a reasonable probability to get a corrupted committee. Hence,
for k and k¯ fixed, the adversary should spend O(N) to perform
a miscertification attack with reasonable probability.
To perform a denial of service, A cannot act at the network
level or at the blockchain level (by threat model). The only
way for A to block a certification process is to force honest
members to be less than k¯. To do this, A should corrupt more
than k − k¯ = k(1 − α) members. Hence, the same argument
we showed for miscertification applies where we substitute α
with 1− α.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we provide a comparison analysis between
the basic protocols (see Section III) and the decentralized
ones (see Section IV) in terms of latency and of messages
transmitted through the endpoint.
We start by analyzing the time taken by decentralized
protocols from when the transaction with the certification
request R is broadcasted to when the certification is known
to all nodes. We call this interval of time the latency of the
protocol. We assume the delay for creating and signing a
challenge to be negligible with respect to other delays involved
in the protocol.
We call b the interval of time between two consecutive
blocks. For simplicity, we assume b to be constant and the
number of transactions a single block can host is greater than
the committee size k. We denote by b¯ < b the time that a
transaction waits before acceptance. The expected value of b¯
is b/2, if the instant in which a new transaction is received
by the blockchain is independent from previous block commit
time. We call p, with p  b, the time to propagate a block
Subject Blockchain
Committee
Member
R
Proof
Accept
ance
p
b¯
p
e
kW
p
p
⌈
2p+e+kW
b
⌉
b
Fig. 3. Timings for Protocol 3.
Subject Blockchain
Committee
Member
Challenges kW
e
p
p
⌈
2p+e+kW
b
⌉
b
Proof
Accept
ance p b
R p
b¯
p
p
Fig. 4. Timings for Protocol 4.
to all nodes. We assume that the time to propagate a new
(still unaccepted) transaction to all nodes is also p. We call
W the time that a single message takes to be transmitted to
the endpoint and e the time it takes to arrive to destination,
hence, k messages are received after e+ kW time.
Latency of Protocol 3 is easily derived by observing the
diagram in Figure 3 and it turns out to be
⌈
2p+e+kW
b
⌉
b +
2p + b¯. Analogously by observing the diagram in Figure 4,
we derive the latency of Protocol 4, which is given by(⌈
2p+e+kW
b
⌉
+ 1
)
b+2p+b¯. We note that, for both protocols,
after certification is recorded in the chain, a verifier takes
negligible time to check it.
About the latency of basic protocols, let v be the number
of verifiers. We assume each verifier verifies 〈S,E〉 only one
time. We assume that the alternative communication mean M
between the subject and each verifier has negligible latency
and transmission time. The latency of the basic protocols turns
out to be e+ vW .
Concerning the number of messages that have to be trans-
mitted through the endpoint, the basic protocols send v mes-
sages overall, while both our protocols send only k messages.
Since our protocols use the endpoint only to transmit a
constant number of messages during the certification, they turn
out to be advantageous when v > k. We note that k can be
tuned to obtain a spectrum of tradeoffs between efficiency
and security. We also note that our protocols turns out to be
advantageous also with respect to latency when W is large
and v  k.
Endpoint Message Cost to sendone message
Security (Attack difficulty) Suggested
Protocolspoofing (P3) eavesdropping (P4)
Phone number SMS SMS cost High: telecom op.
countermeasures Medium: it requires
physical or logical
proximity to the endpoint
to miscertify
P3: to charge
cost on subjectPhone number phone call with IVR phone call cost
Postal mail address letter stamp Low P4: for
security reasonEmail address email negligible Low
IP address IP packet negligible Low
Web page
Page change and HTTP response for P3
HTTP GET/POST for P4 (technically complex) negligible Medium:proximity required
P3: easier to
implement
DNS name DNS response (P3 only) negligible High: distributed - P3
Bank account/IBAN description field of bank transfer transfer cost High High P3 or P4
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF ENDPOINT FEATURES. FOR BREVITY, PROTOCOLS 3 AND 4 ARE REFERRED AS P3 AND P4.
VII. APPLICATION CONTEXTS
Nowadays, users already provide proofs-of-possession re-
garding endpoints in a number of situations. Since, they can
be easily turned into use cases for our protocols, we briefly
review some of them in this section. Table I summarizes the
most common cases. The table reports the endpoint, the kind
of message used to proof its possession, the cost, a brief
remark about the security regarding its use in our protocols,
and the suggested protocol choice. Phone numbers can be
certified by both SMS or IVR-based phone calls. Regular
postal addresses can be certified by sending letters, even if
they may be impractical for large committees. A static web
page is easy to use as a broadcast channel in the direction from
server to browser(s) for Protocol 3. The opposite direction is
also an option, but it requires the web site owner to be able to
get details of the GET/POST request. DNS records can also
be used as broadcast channel for Protocol 3 while the opposite
direction is not available since queries are usually served by
third party servers. For bank transfers, a small amount to
transfer might also be needed. Concerning security, in most
cases eavesdropping is easy if the attacker can reach a position
that is close to the endpoint that (s)he intends to miscertify.
This is true also for SMS (which are weekly encrypted),
but this risk is usually accepted in two-factor authentication
procedures. In certain cases, it might be possible to mitigate
this risk by using encryption (e.g, as for SSL/TLS for IP),
but this may increase complexity and number of messages
substantially. For the web, the spoofing attack requires first
to eavesdrop the request, hence proximity to endpoint is
required. For DNS, responses are generated by third party
servers in a distributed manner, hence, the attacker cannot
exploit endpoint proximity. Eavesdropping on the committee
side is hard, as well. Concerning bank transfers, we assume
that confidentiality and integrity are assured by the interbank
communication network.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We described two blockchain-based decentralized protocols
to create verifiable claims regarding ownership of a certain
endpoint. We believe that our contribution complements the
use of decentralized identifier and is a further step toward a
fully decentralized IdM process.
With respect to currently adopted naive approaches, our
protocols do not require the subject to be on-line and the
endpoint load does not depends on the number of verifications.
This makes our approach especially suited in applications
where a large number of subjects that are not always on-line
are needed to be verified by a large number of verifiers.
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